Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

This is to the effect that even if the injured party was originally at fault (as when he was on the wrong side of the street) still if the person who finally caused the accident had the “last clear opportunity” to avoid striking him, he who could have prevented the injury is still liable if he did not take advantage of such opportunity or chance.

Other names are doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, the humanitarian doctrine.

This is a usual sight in vehicular accidents along national highways. For example a car on the right side of the lane is followed by a passenger jeep while on the other side of the lane is a truck. Then the jeep tries to overtake the car in front of it by swerving to the other lane thereby facing the upcoming truck. If the truck is at a reasonable distance from the overtaking jeep where he still has the opportunity to avoid the jeep but he did not do so, he will be liable under the doctrine of last clear chance. This doctrine is usually applicable to quasi-delicts or culpa aquiliana where negligence may be hard to prove. The truck driver, who finally caused the accident, had the last clear opportunity of avoiding the vehicle but he did not take advantage of such opportunity. However, the contributory negligence of the jeep driver will mitigate the damages to be paid by the truck driver.

However, as held in the case of Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil 398, where a visitor was drowned in a swimming pool of a resort due to his own negligence and despite measures on the part of the resort authorities to save him, the SC held that the resort is not liable because while it is duty bound to provide for safety measures, still it is not an absolute insurer of the safety of its customers or visitors. The doctrine of “last clear chance” cannot apply if the:

a. Negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant (in pari delicto); b. Party charged is required to act instantaneously;
c. Injury cannot be avoided despite the application at all times of all the means to avoid the injury (after the peril is or should have been discovered), at least in all instances where the previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury at all.